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BIOFUELS, FOOD SECURITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
BY ROSAMOND L. NAYLOR, ADAM J. LISKA,
MARSHALL B. BURKE, WALTER P. FALCON, JOANNE C. GASKELL,
SCOTT D. ROZELLE, AND KENNETH G. CASSMAN

The integration of the agricultural and energy sectors caused by rapid growth in the biofuels market signals
a new era in food policy and sustainable development. For the first time in decades, agricultural commodity
markets could experience a sustained increase in prices, breaking the long-term price decline that has benefited food consumers worldwide. Whether this transition occurs—and how it will affect global hunger and
poverty—remain to be seen. Will food markets begin to track the volatile energy market in terms of price
and availability? Will changes in agricultural commodity markets benefit net food producers and raise farm
incomes in poor countries? How will biofuels-induced changes in agricultural commodity markets affect net
consumers of food? At risk are more than 800 million food-insecure people—mostly in rural areas and dependent to some extent on agriculture for incomes—who live on less than $1 per day and spend the majority of
their incomes on food.1 An additional 2–2.5 billion people living on $1 to $2 per day are also at risk, as rising
commodity prices could pull them swiftly into a food-insecure state.
The potential impact of a large global expansion of biofuels production capacity on net food producers
and consumers in low-income countries presents challenges for food policy planners and raises the question
of whether sustainable development targets at a more general level can be reached.2 Achieving the 2015
Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2000, which include
halving the world’s undernourished and impoverished, lies at the core of global initiatives to improve human
well-being and equity,3 yet today, virtually no progress has been made toward achieving the dual goals of
alleviating global hunger and poverty. The record varies on a regional basis: Gains have been made in many
Asia-Pacific and Latin American-Caribbean countries, but progress has been mixed in South Asia, and setbacks have occurred in numerous sub-Saharan African countries.4 Whether the biofuels boom will move
extremely poor countries closer to or further from the Millennium Development Goals remains uncertain.
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Biofuels growth also will influence
efforts to meet two sets of longer-run
development targets.5 The first encompasses the goals of a “sustainability
transition,” articulated by the Board on
Sustainable Development of the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences, which
seeks to provide energy, materials, and
information to meet the needs of a global
population of 8–10 billion by 2050, while
reducing hunger and poverty and preserving the planet’s environmental lifesupport systems. The second is the Great
Transition of the Global Scenario Group,
convened by the Stockholm Environment Institute, which focuses specifically
on reductions in hunger and greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions beyond 2050. As
additional demands are placed on the
agricultural resource base for fuel production, will ecosystem services (such
as hydrologic balances, biodiversity, and
soil quality) that support agricultural
activities be eroded? Will biofuels development require a large expansion of crop

area, which would involve conversion of
marginal land, rainforest, and wetlands
to arable land? And what will be the net
effect of biofuels expansion on global
climate change?
Although the questions outnumber the
answers at this stage, two trends seem
clear: total energy use will continue to
escalate as incomes rise in both industrial
and developing countries, and biofuels
will remain a critical energy development
target in many parts of the world if petroleum prices exceed $55–60 per barrel.
Even if petroleum prices dip, policy support for biofuels as a means of boosting
rural incomes in several key countries will
likely generate continued expansion of
biofuels production capacity. These trends
will have widespread ripple effects on
food security—defined here as the ability
of all people at all times to have access to
affordable food and nutrition for a healthy
life—and on the environment at local,
regional, and global scales. The ripple
effects will be either positive or negative

Per capita energy consumption in kilograms
of oil equivalent;
Per capita cereal consumption in kilograms

Figure 1. Global per capita cereal and energy
consumption versus per capita income for 2003–2004
energy consumption
cereal consumption

Per capita income (in U.S. dollars)

NOTE: Cereal consumption includes cereal consumed directly and feed
grains fed to livestock.
SOURCE: Energy and income data from World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2007 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007); cereal data from
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT,
http://faostat.fao.org.
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depending on the country in question and
policies in play.

Overriding Engel’s Law
The increasing use of food and feed
crops for fuel is altering the fundamental
economic dynamics that have governed
global agricultural markets for the past
century. Investments in crop-based biofuels production are rising steadily as
countries seek substitutes for high-priced
petroleum products, GHG-emitting fossil fuels, and energy supplies originating from politically unstable countries.6
While both energy and food demand rise
with income growth, the rate of increase
is much greater for energy (see Figure 1
on this page). Declining marginal demand
for food in the aggregate with income
growth—a pattern widely referred to by
the economic development community as
Engel’s Law—coupled with impressive
increases in world food production have
led to a steady decline in real food prices
over the past century.7 To date, Engel’s
Law has withstood various purported
challenges, such as the emergence of
China and India into the global economy,
the world’s rising wealth, and the rapidly
expanding demand for meat worldwide.
The same pattern does not hold for
energy prices, however, which have oscillated significantly in past decades and
increased in real (inflation-adjusted)
terms since the mid-1990s (see Figure 2
on page 33). It is clear that until recently,
real prices for food and petroleum have
not moved systematically in the same
direction. But if energy markets begin to
determine the value of agricultural commodities, the long-term trend of declining
real prices for most agricultural commodities could be reversed and Engel’s
Law overridden. Over the short term, this
reversal, while helping net food producers
in poor areas, could have substantial consequences for the world’s food-insecure,
especially those who consume foods that
are direct or indirect substitutes for biofuels feedstocks. Moreover, fuel prices have
generally been more volatile than staple
commodity prices (as seen in Figure 2).
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For example, crude oil prices have been
roughly twice as variable as global maize
prices over the last 35 years based on the
coefficient of variation. Food price volatility has the largest impact on extremely
poor households, who typically spend
55–75 percent of their income on food.8

Energy-Agriculture Price
Linkages
Assessing the potential impact of biofuels expansion on global food security
requires a sense of which crops, which
regions, and what types of demandsupply substitutions are most sensitive
to the convergence of energy and agriculture. Because crop-based biofuels
are used predominantly for motor fuels,
regions with large endemic food insecurity will likely not be substantial sources
of biofuels demand or supply in the near
term, with a few important exceptions
discussed below. Also, conversion of non-

food cellulosic crops to biofuels will
likely account for only a small proportion
of total biofuels production over the next
10 years—and maybe longer (see the
box on page 34). Hence, global biofuels
production capacity will largely depend
on the use of food and feed crops. Based
on these assumptions, the primary effect
of biofuels development on food security over the next decade will likely be
through movements in international food
prices induced by activities in middle- and
high-income countries. The energy yield
of crops is an important determinant of
future biofuels development patterns (see
the box on page 36). Production costs
and returns, as well as market integration
between biofuels and fossil fuels, are also
fundamental determinants of agro-energy
price linkages.
The transmission of energy prices to
agricultural markets has traditionally
been viewed in terms of energy inputs
to agriculture (such as fertilizer, mechanization, and transportation). Now the

relationship is determined by the “parity
price” between crops and fossil fuels (also
referred to as the “break-even price”),
defined as the price at which the revenues
from crop-based biofuels production are
sufficient to cover production costs.9 Several basic models have been developed to
project the transmission of energy prices
to agricultural markets.10 The models
show that once differences in energy content are accounted for (for example, a liter
of ethanol contains roughly two-thirds the
energy of a liter of gasoline), the ethanol
price should equal the gasoline price,
which itself closely tracks the price of
petroleum. The same holds for biodiesel
and diesel fuel.

Price Transmission in the
International Market
Although the relationship between
energy and agricultural commodity prices
is fairly well understood, the transmission

indexed, 2000 =1

indexed, 2000 =1

Figure 2. Global trends in prices of food commodities and crude oil 1970–2007

Long-run trends in inflation-corrected prices

Trends in nominal prices since January 2005 with
futures prices for maize and crude for December
2007 and 2008

NOTE: Crude prices are international averages.
SOURCE: Historical data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/. Futures
data from Chicago Board of Trade, http://cbot.com; and http://tradingcharts.com.
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of agricultural prices from major biofuelsproducing and consuming nations to the
international market—and to local markets in food-deficit countries—is less certain. There are several good qualitative
models for global agricultural price transmission effects, and some limited quantitative models.11 Here we present a basic
analytical framework for conceptualizing
price transmission dynamics and describe
the potential effects on both commodity
markets and the environment for four
major players in the biofuels market: the
United States, Brazil, China, and Indonesia. These countries were selected on the
basis of their roles in global production,
exports, imports, and potential expansion
of production in five key commodities:
maize, cassava, sugar cane, soy, and oil

palm. The United States and Brazil combined account for more than 90 percent
of global bio-ethanol production. China
is the third largest bio-ethanol producer,
and Indonesia is quickly becoming the
biggest oil palm producer globally.
The effects of crop-based biofuels on
food prices can be traced through direct and
indirect dynamics of production and consumption (see the box on page 38). These
dynamics include the responsiveness of
demand and supply for the relevant agricultural commodities to prices, which depends
in large part on the substitution possibilities
in production and consumption (for food,
feed, and fuel); the ability of countries to
expand land area and raise yields for biofuels feedstocks; market integration between
the biofuels and fossil fuels markets; and

border and domestic policy incentives on
biofuels and feedstock production and consumption, such as those promoted in the
current U.S. energy and farm bills. The
short- and long-run effects may differ substantially depending on the biophysical
sustainability of individual crop production
systems. The long-run effects will also be a
function of changing incomes, tastes, biofuels research and development, and infrastructure investments. Finally, in addition
to market price dynamics, potential nonmarket costs and benefits to society from
expansion of biofuels production capacity
include changes in native species’ habitat,
biodiversity, air and water quality, and net
GHG emissions.

U.S. Maize Production for
Domestic Bio-ethanol

CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS POTENTIAL
Second-generation biofuels from ligno-cellulosic biomass (such as forestry and crop residues,
corn stover, and switchgrass) are widely regarded as preferred feedstock for biofuel production because the vast abundance of biomass crops could support a larger biofuel industry
than can be supported by food crops alone.1 However, current cellulosic biomass-to-fuel
conversion processes are still under development, and large-scale harvesting, storage, and
refinery systems are not yet cost-effective. Several companies operate pilot-scale facilities and
will develop small commercial-scale biorefineries for wood chips, prairie grasses, and crop
residues within two to three years.2 But even those sources of feedstock are becoming more
expensive. Rapid expansion of maize bio-ethanol from grain has raised the price of potential
feedstock sources, such as hay and forage crops; for example, the price of maize crop residue
used for cattle and dairy feed has doubled in Nebraska during the past year.
Cellulosic biomass is composed of sugar polymers that can be broken down and fermented
into ethanol; however, because it provides the structural rigidity for plants and trees, it has
evolved to be highly resistant to degradation from predatory organisms.3 Enzymes are being
developed for ligno-cellulose degradation, but their conversion efficiency is limited and their
cost is currently too high for large-scale commercialization. Water requirements for large-scale
cellulosic ethanol conversion and infrastructure costs also are not well understood but could be
significantly higher than for maize bio-ethanol according to some expert estimates.4 Biomass
can also be converted to biodiesel via thermochemical processes—thereby avoiding some of
the constraints to the large-scale deployment of cellulosic ethanol—but production remains at
a pilot scale.5 Due to these current constraints, observers predict that mature technology for
large-scale deployment of cellulosic biofuels production is at least 10 years away.6 During this
10-year period, biofuels production capacity based on food crops will continue to expand at
a rapid pace.
1. For some analysis of cellulosic biofuels, see M. K. Heiman and B. D. Solomon, “Fueling U.S. Transportation: The
Hydrogen Economy and Its Alternatives,” Environment 49, no. 8 (October 2007): 10–25.
2. B. Hahn-Hagerdal et al., “Bio-ethanol: The Fuel of Tomorrow from the Residues of Today,” Trends in Biotechnology 24, no. 12 (December 2006): 549–56.
3. M. E. Himmel et al., “Biomass Recalcitrance: Engineering Plants and Enzymes for Biofuels Production,” Science
315, no. 5813 (9 February 2007): 804–7.
4. M. M. Wright and R. C. Brown, “Comparative Economics of Biorefineries Based on the Biochemical and Thermochemical Platforms,” Biofuels, Bioproducts and Biorefining 1, no. 1 (September 2007): 49–56.
5. G. W. Huber, S. Iborra, and A. Corma, “Synthesis of Transportation Fuels from Biomass: Chemistry, Catalysts,
and Engineering,” Chemical Reviews 106, no. 9 (2006): 4044–98.
6. M. E. Himmel et al., note 3 above.
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The United States accounts
for roughly 40 percent of world
maize production (see the table
in the box on page 36) and
typically contributes 55–60
percent of total global trade in
maize.12 As a result, the amount
of maize grown in the United
States, and the share of maize
used for domestic consumption versus exports, has significant impact on international
maize prices.
The sustained high price of
petroleum in recent years, translating directly into high gasoline
prices, has provided impetus for
growth in the domestic maize bioethanol industry. Combined with
policy incentives that include a
$0.13 per liter ($0.51 per gallon)
blending credit for ethanol, a
$0.14 per liter ($0.54 per gallon)
tariff on imported ethanol, a 2.5
percent additional duty on the
value of imported ethanol, and
a mandate to phase out MTBE
(methyl tertiary-butyl ether)
as a fuel additive (ethanol is a
good substitute for MTBE), the
domestic industry is expanding
rapidly. Annual production of
U.S. bio-ethanol was 18.5 bil-
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lion liters in 2006, surpassing Brazil (at
17 billion liters) for the first time. U.S.
output is expected to reach 30 billion
liters by the end of 2007 and 45 billion
liters by the end of 2009. Although the
2006 bio-ethanol output accounts for only
2.5 percent of the country’s 530 billion
liter annual gasoline consumption on an
equivalent energy basis, it is transforming
the agricultural sector.
In response to this rapid increase in
ethanol production capacity, maize prices
rose from $2.60 per bushel in July 2006
to $4.25 per bushel at the start of planting
in March 2007.13 The high price caused
acreage planted to maize in 2007 to rise
19 percent over 2006 plantings to almost
38 million hectares.14 This was the largest
area planted to maize since 1944. Most
of this expansion came at the cost of
soybean plantings; soy acreage declined
15 percent from a record high in 2006 to
about 26 million hectares in 2007. Acreage planted to wheat rose 6 percent to
about 24 million hectares due to higher
prices caused by global supply shortages
and increased livestock demand. Perhaps
most striking has been the massive appreciation in agricultural land values. The
average price of U.S. farmland increased
74 percent between 2000 and 2007 to a
record $4,700 per hectare. In Iowa—a
leading maize-producing state—farmland
values rose by roughly $2,470 per hectare
between 2003 and 2007 to more than
$7,900 per hectare.15
What these changes mean for U.S.
maize plantings and international maize
prices over the longer run remains uncertain. Maize prices fell in mid-July 2007 to
$3.55 per bushel due to increased supply,
but futures prices for December 2008
are still about $4.00 per bushel indicating the strength of expected demand.16
Future demand for maize bio-ethanol will
depend importantly on consumer preferences, flex-fuel fleet expansion, and infrastructure investments. Investments have
already been made in nearly a hundred
new bio-ethanol plants throughout the
country, paving the road for continued
growth in the industry. Moreover, strong
policy support for maize bio-ethanol,
driven in large part by the underlying

Rising demand for ethanol is causing expansion of maize acres in the United States.

goals of boosting rural incomes in leading farm states and reducing foreign oil
imports, will likely bolster future demand
for maize.
The real limitation is likely to be on
the supply side. Assuming that maize area
remains at 38 million hectares with trendline yield growth, about one-third of the
maize crop would be needed for ethanol
production in 2010, up from 17 percent in
2006. The United States is fundamentally
constrained in how much maize can be
produced for bio-ethanol by both land
area and yield potential. Although maize
area expanded this year at the cost of
other crops, such as soy, price feedbacks
(as described in the box on page 38) limit
the amount of area substitution that will
occur over time. For example, the potential for a further shift of additional soybean area to maize is likely to be small,
if any, because soybean prices have also
risen to record levels due to the reduction
in soybean area in 2007. Some agricultural lands that were previously removed
from production for programs like the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) are
now being brought back into maize cultivation. CRP is at a critical juncture with
roughly 400,000 contracts on 11.3 million
hectares (24 million acres) scheduled to
expire between 2007 and 2010.17 In the
2007 Farm Bill, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) is proposing to
give priority on re-authorization of CRP
contracts to whole-field enrollment for
lands used for biomass production or
energy (mainly cellulosic feedstocks).18

Unless such biomass systems include a
diverse mixture of perennial crop species,
introducing monocultures into CRP lands
will likely have adverse effects on biodiversity and wildlife habitat—two main
CRP goals.
The yield potential for U.S. maize is also
limited, despite some private sector claims
to the contrary. Maize yield increases will
likely remain on their current trajectory of
about 1.8 bushels per acre per year (0.113
tons per hectare per year) even with current efforts to improve maize hybrids
by the major seed companies. Because
farmers will be motivated to achieve high
yields in response to high maize prices,
they are likely to apply greater amounts
of inputs, especially fertilizers, since the
ratio of maize price to fertilizer cost has
increased. Although potentially beneficial
for yields, greater fertilizer inputs can also
have negative implications for nitrogen
and phosphorous loss to groundwater,
surface water, and the atmosphere (for
example, nitrous oxide, a potent GHG,
and regional nitrogen oxide (NOX) pollution) unless farmers also modify methods
of fertilizer application to achieve greater
efficiency and smaller losses.

Chinese Cassava Imports for
Domestic Bio-ethanol
China presents an interesting case for
analyzing the sustainability of biofuel
systems because the country is the most
rapidly growing consumer of transportation fuels in the world market, is the
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largest contributor of GHG emissions
(recently surpassing the United States),
and is highly constrained in terms of land
resources for food and feedstock production.19 Bio-ethanol production in China’s
officially sanctioned plants during the past
3–5 years has been around 1.3 billion
liters. One pro-biofuels faction of the
government has argued for ambitious bioethanol targets of up to 6.3 billion liters
by 2012, with 50 percent of the country’s
motor fuel containing 10 percent ethanol.
There also has been a strong reaction
by a separate government faction to rising
cereal prices in 2007, however, and to the
prospects of allocating a significant share
of China’s crops to energy production.
More than 85 percent of the bio-ethanol
produced prior to 2006 has used maize,
rice, and cassava as feedstocks.20

An ambitious biofuels program would
very likely raise China’s demand for
staple food imports—a potential shift
that makes the government increasingly
concerned over the domestic food security implications of biofuels growth. As a
result, China’s top leaders implemented a
new policy in 2007 that prevents crop production for bio-ethanol on land traditionally devoted to staple grain production.
Instead, minor crops, such as cassava,
sweet potato, and sweet sorghum that
are grown on marginal soils outside the
primary grain belt are being encouraged
for use as feedstocks. Of all the non-grain
bio-ethanol resources, sweet sorghum is
a favorite among agricultural experts due
to its low cost and ability to grow on
marginal land.21 The government aims to
produce 3.8 million tons of bio-ethanol

annually from sweet sorghum stalks.22
This amount translates into 4.8 billion
liters of ethanol—almost one-third of
Brazil’s 2005 production.
Will China be a major bio-ethanol
feedstock producer in the future with the
ban on maize, wheat, and other staple
crops in place? The answer depends in
large part on the availability of non-traditional feedstocks, and hence on marginal
land for crop production. China currently
feeds more than one-fifth of the world’s
population on only 7 percent of the global
cultivated land area.23 The country’s total
arable land is around 130 million hectares, most of which has been used during
the past 50 years to meet food demand.
Internal official reports suggest that an
additional 116 million hectares of marginal land exists—mainly in the south-

ENERGY YIELDS AND GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION
POTENTIAL OF LEADING BIOFUELS
First-generation biofuels are produced from conversion of plant
starch, sugars, oils, and animal fats into an energy source that
can be used in combustion engines to replace gasoline and diesel
fuel derived from petroleum. Currently, bio-ethanol is the most
widely used biofuel and acts as a substitute for (or is blended
with) gasoline. It is produced by fermentation from a number of
crops, including sugarcane, maize, cassava, wheat, sugar beet, and
sweet sorghum. Biodiesel, widely used in Europe, is made from
extracted vegetable oil using crops such as rapeseed, soybean,
oil palm, and sunflower. As of 2005, leading bio-ethanol producing countries include Brazil (16.5 gigaliters per year), the United
States (16.2), China (2.0), the European Union (1.0), and India
(0.3).1 Major biodiesel producers include Germany (1.9 gigaliters
per year), France (0.5), the United States (0.3), and Italy (0.2).
Among the major feedstock crops, biofuel energy yield (gigajoules per hectare) is greatest for Malaysian palm oil and smallest
for Brazilian soybean with a 10-fold difference between the two
based on current crop yields and processing yields (see the table
at right). On average, the energy yield per hectare from Malaysian
oil palm was 1.4-fold greater than the energy yield from Brazilian sugarcane, 2-fold greater than U.S. maize, 4-fold greater than
Brazilian cassava.2 It should be noted, however, that these figures
represent gross biofuel energy yields; they do not account for
energy expended in the cultivation, harvesting, and processing of
the crops, which would reduce their net energy yields.
Because biofuels recycle atmospheric carbon dioxide, they
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to petroleum
fuels; however, fossil fuel energy inputs used in the biofuel production lifecycle lower the GHG mitigation potential of biofuels. After
accounting for energy inputs, Brazilian sugarcane bio-ethanol
has the greatest net GHG mitigation potential and is estimated to
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reduce GHG emissions by approximately 100 percent compared
to gasoline on an energy-equivalent basis.3 Maize bio-ethanol, soybean biodiesel, and cassava bio-ethanol have been shown to reduce
net GHG emissions compared to gasoline by similar amounts:
13–52 percent, 41 percent, and 40 percent respectively.4 The GHG
mitigation potential of oil palm biodiesel could be as high as sugarcane bio-ethanol for established plantations, but forest clearing
for new plantation establishment, particularly by burning, could
release stored carbon and lead to significant net increases in GHG
emissions relative to petroleum use.5
1. Worldwatch Institute, Biofuels for Transportation: Global Potential and Implications for Sustainable Agriculture and Energy in the 21st Century (Washington,
DC, 2006).
2. A. E. Farrell et al., “Ethanol Can Contribute to Energy and Environmental
Goals,” Science 311, no. 506 (27 January 2006): 506–8; I. Macedo, M. Lima Verde,
and J. Azevedo, Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Production and
Use of Fuel Ethanol in Brazil, Government of the State of São Paulo and Secretariat
of the Environment (São Paulo, Brazil, 2004); T. L. T. Nguyen, S. H. Gheewala, and
S. Garivait, “Full Chain Energy Analysis of Fuel Ethanol from Cassava in Thailand,”
Environmental Science & Technology 41, no. 11 (2007): 4135–42; and J. Hill et
al., “Environmental, Economic, and Energetic Costs and Benefits of Biodiesel and
Ethanol Biofuels,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103, no. 30
(2006): 11206–10.
3. Macedo, Lima Verde, and Azevedo, note 2 above.
4. Farrell et al., note 2 above; M. Wang, M. Wu, H. Huo, “Life-cycle Energy
and Greenhouse Gas Emission Impacts of Different Corn Ethanol Plant Types”
Environmental Research Letters 2 (2007): 024001; Hill et al., note 2 above; Z. Hu et
al., “Economics, Environment, and Energy Life Cycle Assessment of Automobiles
Fueled by Bio-ethanol Blends in China,” Renewable Energy 29, no. 14 (2004):
2183–92.
5. M. B. Wahid, C. K. Weng, C. Y. May, and C. M. Chin, “The Need to Reduce
National Greenhouse Emissions: Oil Palm Industry’s Role,” Journal of Oil Palm
Research special issue (2006): 1–23.
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west—and that roughly 20 percent (23
million hectares) of this land is biophysically suitable for feedstock production.
Although possible, it is doubtful that such
vast tracts of land would be suitable for
crop-based feedstock production, particularly since much of the area is on sloping
land prone to serious erosion.
Large areas of marginal land have
also been put into the Grain for Green

Program (China’s version of the Conservation Reserve Program), and the government is committed to preventing this land
from being planted in row crops. The
environmental costs of converting vast
areas of marginal land to crop production
are only beginning to be explored. Moreover, the economic feasibility of developing these areas for feedstock production
is debatable since the unskilled wage

is rising, which could make the costs
of cultivating and transporting nontraditional crops—all labor-intensive activities—prohibitively expensive.
As a result of these constraints, China is
looking for feedstock production opportunities outside its borders. Some internal
reports suggest that the China Oil and
Food Corporation is investing in several
Southeast Asian countries (Laos, Cambo-

Agricultural production of ﬁve major feedstocks and biofuel energy yields
Biofuel type

Bio-ethanol

Biofuel crop
Country, top two
crop producers in 2005

Maize

Biodiesel

Sugarcane

Cassava

Soybean

Oil Palm

United
States

China

Brazil

India

Nigeria

Brazil

United
States

Brazil

Malaysia

Indonesia

Total productiona 2005, in
million metric tonnes

280

133

420

232

42

26

83

50

76

64

Percentage of world
production,a 2005

40

19

33

18

20

12

39

24

44

37

Average crop yield,a
2003–2005, in
metric tonnes per hectare

9.4

5.0

73.5

60.7

10.8

13.6

2.7

2.4

20.6

17.8

Conversion yieldb in liters
per metric ton

399

399

74.5

74.5

137

137

205

205

230

230

Biofuel yieldc in liters per
hectare

3751

1995

5476

4522

1480

1863

552

491

4736

4092

Energy yieldd in
gigajoules per hectare

79.1

41.1

116

95.4

31.2

39.3

18.2

16.1

156

135

2005 petroleum
replacement,e percent of
total petroleum use

2.0

2.4

40.4

1.8

-

-

0.1

-

-

-

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT, http://faostat.fao.org/ (accessed 4 August 2007).
Feedstock conversion yields for maize: H. Shapouri and P. Gallagher, 2002 Ethanol Cost-of-Production Survey, USDA-ERS, AER
no. 841 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, Office of the Chief Economist, Office of Energy Policy and New
Uses, 2005), http://www.usda.gov/oce/reports/energy/USDA_2002_ETHANOL.pdf (accessed 25 September 2006); sugarcane:
J. Goldemberg, “Ethanol for a Sustainable Energy Future,” Science 315, no. 5813 (9 February 2007): 808–10; cassava: Nguyen et
al., note 2 at left; soybean: Hill et al., note 2 at left; oil palm: calculated, 20 percent of harvested mass is crude oil, 1:1 conversion
of crude palm oil-to-biodiesel (Dr. Ma Ah Ngan, Malaysian Palm Oil Board, in personal communication with the authors, September
2006). Palm oil density is 0.87 kilograms per liter.
c
Biofuel yield = crop yield x conversion yield.
d
Gross energy yield; lower heating value of ethanol 21.1 megajoules per liter or biodiesel 32.9 megajoules per liter x conversion yield x
crop yield.
e
Biofuel production capacity converted to energy-equivalents of gasoline (or diesel). Petroleum replacement based on gasoline and
diesel use in 2003 for each respective country. Worldwatch Institute, note 1 at left; and Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual 2004, DOE/EIA-0384 (Washington, DC, 2005).
a

b
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dia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) for biofuels feedstock production;
it already leases hundreds of hectares in
Laos for cassava production. There also
is speculation that the company is buying property in the Philippines to plant
oil palm. These arrangements—if they
come to fruition—will have wide-ranging
implications for rural incomes, employment, trade, and the environment for the
participating countries.
From a global food security perspective, the largest impact of China’s activities might be seen through the international cassava market. In the past, cassava
has been traded internationally in small
volumes, mainly for feed, and subject to a
peculiar set of EU trade policies.24 World
trade in cassava has risen recently to 8–10
percent of global production, reflecting
China’s entrance into the world market for livestock feed and biofuel feedstocks. China’s cassava imports account
for roughly two-thirds of total world trade
and now stand at 12.5 million metric tons
annually, up from 2 million metric tons
in 2000.25 Virtually all these imports are
sourced from Southeast Asia, with Thailand as the largest world exporter (and
re-exporter). If China’s cassava demand
continues to increase in the international
market, it is expected that cassava prices
will rise significantly. Will the international livestock sector or the world’s poor
be more vulnerable to the expected price
increase? Understanding the ripple effects
of China’s demand on poor net consumers
and producers of cassava in regions as
distant as Sub-Saharan Africa will require
further analyses.

market-integrated biofuels industry.26
Sugarcane bio-ethanol now accounts for
40 percent of automobile motor fuel in
the country and requires about 54 percent
of the sugarcane crop. Overall, Brazil
accounts for one-third of global sugarcane
production, which is produced on 5.6
million hectares, or about 10 percent of
the country’s total existing cropland. With
rapidly growing internal and export mar-

kets for ethanol, there are now plans to
expand production by adding another 136
bio-ethanol plants to the existing stock of
357 facilities.27
In comparison to the United States
and China, expansion of Brazilian biofuels production is significantly less
constrained by land. Over the next 10
years, sugarcane-cropped area is estimated to reach roughly 10 million hect-

DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS
OF BIOFUELS EXPANSION
Large-scale biofuels expansion will alter prices of staple food crops through direct
and indirect channels, as illustrated by the hypothetical example of maize bio-ethanol
in the United States (see the figure below). Rapid growth in maize bio-ethanol leads
to price increases in maize, wheat, and soy in the absence of significant yield growth
or crop area expansion. The ripple effects are seen in pristine land areas cleared for
agriculture (for example, conservation land in the United States or rainforests in Brazil), on the livestock sector, and on consumers of these staple food commodities. The
magnitude of effects depends on adjustments in grain, oilseed, and livestock markets,
and on price transmission domestically and internationally.

Dynamics of a biofuels-induced increase in demand
for maize, wheat, and soybeans in the United States

Rising demand for maize leads to
growth in supply along the curve
that includes production a higher
marginal costs.

Longer-run shift in supply due
to technical change induced by
higher prices.

Expansion of Brazilian
Sugarcane and Soy
Brazil has been the world’s largest producer and consumer of bio-ethanol for the
past 25 years and has only recently been
surpassed by the United States. The country is currently the only major exporter
of bio-ethanol. Strong government support and a tropical/subtropical climate to
which sugarcane is well adapted make
Brazil’s the world’s most technologically sophisticated, energy-efficient, and
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Higher maize prices increase
demand for wheat in livestock
markets, causing wheat prices
to rise.

Greater area sown to maize
reduces area planted to soy,
causing soy prices to rise.

NOTE: D = demand curve; S = supply curve.
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Indonesian Oil Palms for
Global Biodiesel
The production of oil palm in Indonesia for biodiesel raises many of the
same issues as the Brazil case. Dubbed
“green gold,” Indonesian oil palm yields
a phenomenal 17.8 tons per hectare and
presently commands a price of more than
US$750 per ton.35 Though Malaysian
yields are higher on average, Indonesia
benefits from abundant land resources and
lower wages. Production costs in Indonesia are around $185 per hectare, compared
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ares.28 Although current production is
primarily localized in the southern state
of São Paolo, the anticipated expansion
will likely displace livestock pastures and
other crops, thus indirectly raising distant
Amazon deforestation.29
Soybean cultivation in Brazil for feed
and biodiesel poses a more direct threat
to the Amazonian rainforest in the central
state of Mato Grasso.30 Soybean expansion has moved northward over the last 30
years and is projected by some to reduce
the Amazonian rainforest by 40 percent
by 2050.31 Although livestock expansion
has historically been the main cause of
Amazon deforestation, soybean planting often follows livestock pastures and
more recently has been a direct cause
of deforestation.32 The savannahs of the
Brazilian cerrado and the Chaco forest
of Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia are
similarly threatened by crop expansion.33
The cerrado is experiencing dramatic loss
of 2.2–3 million hectares of native habitat
per year. If soybean prices stay high as a
result of the large shift of U.S. soybean
area to maize and increased demand for
biodiesel production, there could be a new
burst of soybean expansion into the Amazon rainforest and cerrado. The expansion
of both sugarcane and soybean will thus
have a significant impact on biodiversity
and, through deforestation, the release of
carbon stored in forest biomass and soil.34
Soil nutrient and hydrological balances
within the Amazonian basin are also likely
to change at a regional scale, raising questions about the sustainability of cropping
systems in the region over the long run.

The supply of food grains that will make it all the way to markets such as this one in
Ecuador will depend on the global crop demands of the alternative fuel industry.

to $226 per hectare for Malaysian palm
oil.36 As a result, Indonesia is expected to
overtake Malaysia in 2007 as the world’s
largest palm oil exporter.
As the cheapest vegetable oil source
in the global market, palm oil is ideally suited as a biodiesel feedstock. Both
Indonesia and Malaysia have previously
made large commitments to the industry,
each having agreed to use 6 million metric tons of palm oil (about 40 percent of
total output) for biodiesel production.37
Ultimately, the relative prices of crude
and vegetable oil, along with subsidy
and trade policies in the United States
and European Union, will determine the
size of Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s export
markets and, in turn, the magnitude of
investments in oil palm plantations.
Environmental and social justice concerns threaten to limit palm oil’s market
potential. Federal plans, including one
to convert 5 million hectares of central
Borneo rainforest to oil palm, typically
do not include environmental audits or
satisfactory mechanisms for resolving
land conflicts. Even plans that are carefully conceived at the federal level may
be overridden at the local level. Decentralization of government authority in
Indonesia from the federal to provincial
levels has created confusing and conflicting land-use plans and legal structures

and has led to many disputes—sometimes violent—with local inhabitants.
Moreover, the volume of palm oil needed
to meet a biodiesel refinery’s profitability criteria favors large-scale, vertically integrated companies. Fitting
smallholders into biodiesel production
systems is a challenge for Indonesian
policymakers.
The most serious environmental problems stem from converting rainforests
to oil palm plantations.38 Despite laws
to the contrary, land is often cleared by
fire, resulting in regional air pollution
and a substantial release of carbon from
standing biomass and soil, particularly
when peat areas are converted. Forest
conversion also destroys critical habitats
for endangered orangutans and a tremendous array of other species.39 Moreover,
palm oil mill effluents pollute waterways,
further damaging native species’ (and
human) habitat. In response to these problems, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm
Oil—a group of major producers and
international and local nongovernmental
organizations—was initiated in August
2003 to help resolve issues of land tenure
and environmentally destructive management practices.40 This process has created
an essential dialogue and a set of guiding
principles, although smallholder producers remain underrepresented.

ENVIRONMENT

39

An additional challenge for policymakers is the effect of rising palm oil
prices on poor households. Speculation
over biodiesel production in Indonesia
and other countries helped drive crude
palm oil prices up more than 80 percent
between mid-2006 and mid-2007. In
2005 fats and oils comprised 3 percent
of the household budget for the poorest
quartile of the Indonesian population.

This share had been falling with rising
incomes, but it is now rising again due
to the crude palm oil price spikes.41 In
response to social unrest over higher
cooking oil prices, the federal government has increased the export tax on
palm oil from 1.5 percent to 6.5 percent
and is considering a proposal to require
that 3.3 million metric tons (minimum)
of palm oil be sold for domestic use.

Blending mandates have also fallen
from 5 percent to 2.5 percent.42 The
impacts of higher palm oil prices on
future biodiesel investments, the availability of food-based oils in the global
market, and fat intake by the world’s
poorest consumers remain uncertain. It
is clear, however, that biofuels growth is
already transforming the global vegetable
oils sector.

Table 1. Predictions of price changes under various biofuels-related scenarios
Source

Scenario

M. W. Rosegrant, S. Msangi, T. Sulser, and
R. Valmonte-Santos, Biofuels and the Global
Food Balance (Washington, DC: International
Food Policy Research Institute, 2006).

4 percent U.S. gasoline replacement by biofuels, 20 percent elsewhere, up to 58 percent in
Brazil (biodiesel in EU, ethanol elsewhere); no
technology improvement, projected to 2020.

Corn, 41 percent; wheat, 30 percent; soy
(oilseeds) 76 percent; sugar (sugarcane),
66 percent; cassava, 135 percent

Same as above, but with cellulosic technology
online by 2015, and crop productivity improvements, projected to 2020.

Corn, 23 percent; wheat, 16 percent; soy
(oilseeds) 43 percent; sugar (sugarcane),
43 percent; cassava, 54 percent

M. Von Lampe, Agricultural Market Impacts of
Future Growth in the Production of Biofuels
(Paris: Working Party on Agricultural Policies
and Markets, AGR/CA/APM(2005)24/FINAL,
Committee on Agriculture, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development,
2006).

Constant $60 per barrel price of oil, projected
to 2014.

Corn, 19 percent; wheat, 17 percent; soy
(oilseeds) 19 percent; sugar, 20 percent;
vegetable oil, 22.3 percent

“Growth in line with publicly stated goals”; 28
gigaliters in the United States by 2012, projected to 2014.

Corn, 2.5 percent; wheat 4.4 percent; soy
(oilseeds) 1.1 percent; sugar, 4 percent;
vegetable oil, 12.9 percent

Food and Agricultural Policy Research
Institute (FAPRI), Implications of Increased
Ethanol Production for U.S. Agriculture
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri,
FAPRI-UMC Report #10-05 2005)

7 billion gallon U.S.-produced ethanol use, 7.5
billion gallon biodiesel and ethanol imports by
2012, projected from 2012 to 2015, relative to
baseline.

Corn, 5.4 percent; wheat, 1.7 percent; soy,
-0.2 percent; sorghum, 4.2 percent

A. Elobeid, and S. Tokgoz, Removal of U.S.
Ethanol Domestic and Trade Distortions:
Impact on U.S. and Brazilian Ethanol Markets
(CARD Working Paper 06-WP 427, Center
for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa
State University, 2006).

Long-run oil price of $60 per barrel with the
United States using 30 billion gallons of ethanol, projected to 2015, relative to baseline.

Corn, 58 percent; wheat, 20 percent; soy
(meal) -42 percent; soy (oil) 20 percent

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural
Baseline Projections: U.S. Crops, 2007–
2016, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/
Baseline/crops.htm.

12 billion gallons of ethanol, 700 million gallons of biodiesel in the United States, projected to 2016.

Corn, 65 percent; wheat, 33 percent; soy,
19 percent; sugar, -8 percent; sorghum, 64
percent

J. N. Ferris and S. V. Joshi, “An Econometric
Analysis of the Impact of the Expansion in the
U.S. Production of Ethanol from Maize and
Biodiesel from Soybeans on Major Agricultural
Variables, 2005-2015,” in J. Outlaw, K. J. Collins, and J. A. Duffield eds., Agriculture as a
Producer and Consumer of Energy (Cambridge, MA: CABI Publishing, 2006).

5.7 billion gallons of ethanol, 300 million gallons of biodiesel in the United States by 2015,
projected relative to baseline.

Corn, 6 percent; soy (meal), -5 percent; soy
(oil), 31 percent

FAPRI, Baseline Update for U.S. Agricultural
Markets (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, FAPRI-UMC Report #12-06 2006).

6.6 billion gallons ethanol in Brazil, 0.8 billion gallons ethanol in EU, 8 billion gallons in
United States; 4.9 mmt rapeseed oil in EU,
projected to 2015–2016, relative to today.

Corn, 30 percent; wheat, 11 percent;
soy, 2 percent; sugar, 21 percent
(FOB Caribbean); palm oil, 17 percent
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The above case studies indicate that
biofuels are causing an abrupt increase in
demand for agricultural commodities traditionally used for food and feed, which
is placing upward pressure on crop prices.
Whether future price increases and subsequent adjustments in demand and supply
occur at local, regional, or global scales
has yet to be determined. Price transmission models developed for agricultural
trade policy analysis provide some indication of scale; for example, some such
models suggest strong national and global
price transmission for maize and cassava
with the exception of some very lowincome landlocked countries. 43
There are also a number of studies
completed and in progress that project
future agricultural prices related to biofuels development. Table 1 on page 40
summarizes the price forecasts for several
of these studies. Although they are not
directly comparable to one another given
differences in model design, scope, and
time horizon, they offer a glimpse at where
prices might move under various scenarios
of biofuels expansion. These studies generally anticipate large increases in cassava prices, moderate to large increases in
maize prices, slightly smaller increases in
wheat prices, small to large increases in
sugar prices, moderate increases in vegetable and palm oil prices, and ambiguous
effects on soybean prices as meal and oil
prices move in opposite directions. Unfortunately, these models do not project direct
transmission from the international market
to particular countries.
In addition to the anticipated price
increases for virtually all commodities,
three other conclusions seem clear from
Table 1. First, the variance in price predictions tends to swamp the mean. Second, price variability is not treated in
most models. And finally, the focus of
most projections is on a limited number
of scenarios surrounding industrial-world
production. Few studies attempt to quantify the various linkages between biofuels
development and food-insecure people in
low-income countries. As a first cut, some
studies have inferred the potential link-
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ages by dividing countries among food of the poorest countries in the world, palm
and energy importers and exporters by oil accounts for 40 percent of the fats conincome group, but this approach does not sumed on average, and in Bangladesh and
embed the dynamics of rural development Kenya, the rate is 20 percent.48
that might result from higher agricultural
If agricultural commodity prices remain
prices.44 Extensive analytical work based high, the amount of humanitarian food aid
on global and national data sets and inte- available for extremely poor countries is
grated dynamic models is needed to quan- also likely to be affected. Food aid shiptify these linkages more precisely.
ments from the United States are inversely
Understanding what poor people eat and correlated with commodity prices; that is,
how they spend their money on food pro- when cereal prices are high—and when
vides additional insight into the potential poor consumers are apt to need aid the
food security consequences of biofuels most—food aid shipments are low, and
growth. When crops are ranked accord- vice versa.49 In the short run, a sharp
ing to their contribution to average calorie decline in food aid shipments could severeconsumption by the world’s food-insecure ly impact those in need. In Malawi and
population, the main feedstocks appear Zimbabwe, about one-fifth of total coarse
near the top of the list. Sugarcane, maize, cassava, palm
oil, soy, and sorghum comprise
about 30 percent of mean calorie
consumption by people living in
chronic hunger.45
In some countries, such as
Guatemala, Malawi, and Tanzania—all countries with high
rates of malnutrition—people
derive one-third or more of
their calories from maize.46 The
poorest segments of these populations are particularly vulnerable to increasing maize prices.
For example, World Bank survey data from Tanzania indicate
that the poorest quintile spend Biodiesels may be the wave of the future, but at what
five times as much on maize cost to food security?
compared to the richest as a percent of total grain consumption comes from food aid;
expenditure, and roughly twice the mean.47 in Guatemala the share is one-tenth. Food
The same data also show that the poorest aid is seldom a long-run solution to chronic
spend 80 percent of their budget on food, hunger, and perhaps with higher commodias opposed to 60 percent for the richest.
ty prices, there will be greater incentives to
Other key commodities in the biofuels invest in agricultural development in poor
market are also important in the diets countries. The impact of humanitarian aid
of the poor. Cassava accounts for one- is likely to be most acute in the short run as
third and one-half of calories consumed adjustments are being made.
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
One of the greatest uncertainties regardGhana, respectively, and sugar accounts ing the ripple effects of biofuels growth
for a strikingly high share of calories con- on global food security is, indeed, how
sumed in Brazil, Bolivia, and Guatemala. agricultural development patterns will
Palm oil does not represent a particularly respond to rising prices in international
large share of total calories consumed in markets. Will cassava production expand
poor countries, but it does account for in extremely poor countries like Laos and
a large share of the fats consumed. For Cambodia in response to China’s demand
example, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, two and lift rural households out of pover© JOHN VAN HASSELT/CORBIS

Food Security Implications

ENVIRONMENT

41

ty? Will low-income maize producers in
southern and eastern Africa find richer
domestic markets for their crops with the
decline in U.S. food aid? Will there be a
revival of agricultural investments in lowincome food deficit countries where policy
attention has turned elsewhere in recent
decades? These questions are not easy to
answer at this early stage of the biofuels
revolution and will depend on economic
incentives as well as governance in the
world’s poorest countries.

Conclusions and Policy
Implications
As 2007 draws to a close with the
biofuels boom in play, four conclusions
seem clear. First, rapid growth in the bioethanol and biodiesel markets is placing
increasing demands on key agricultural
commodities that have traditionally been
used for food and feeds. As a result,
agricultural commodity prices for the
main feedstocks are rising in international
markets, inducing substitutions in production and consumption that are causing
price increases in a wider array of agricultural markets. It is very likely that the
demand for biofuels and related effects
on agricultural prices will continue as
long as petroleum prices remain above
$55–60 per barrel. A second, related
point is that political economy interests
in some important countries and regions
such as the United States, China, Brazil,
Indonesia, and the European Union will
likely perpetuate growth in biofuels production capacity over the medium term
regardless of short-run fluctuations in
petroleum prices. Such interests include
goals to revitalize rural economies, support agricultural constituencies, generate
foreign investment and foreign exchange
reserves, and create globally competitive
biofuels industries in the face of multiple
incentives to reduce fossil fuel use. Hence
even if petroleum prices fall, demands
on the global agricultural sector will
remain strong.
Third, the leading agricultural commodities used as feedstocks, such as sugarcane,
maize, oil palm, and cassava, are also those
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that comprise a relatively large share of the
diets of food-insecure people worldwide.
Although most poor people live in rural
areas and are dependent on agriculture, the
world’s food-insecure population is comprised mainly of net consumers. The global
food security implications and tradeoffs of
biofuels development thus deserve serious
policy attention.
Finally, biofuels growth will rely primarily on agricultural commodities as
opposed to cellulosic feedstocks over the
coming decade and will be constrained
largely by food crop production capacity.
Agricultural land area is limited in most
regions, and where expansion is possible (for example, Brazil and Indonesia),
the environmental costs related to forest
clearing, GHG emissions, biodiversity
loss, hydrological changes, and reduced
water and soil quality could potentially
offset the benefits from biofuels. In landconstrained regions, raising yields through
ad hoc use of higher fertilizer rates and
water resources without improved technologies to increase input efficiencies
also creates environmental problems.50
The extent to which biofuels growth is
compatible with sustainable development
therefore remains questionable without
a substantial increase in research that
explicitly targets environmentally sound
practices for producing crop-based feedstocks, at least until second-generation
technologies become commercially viable at a large scale. Even then, land conversion to cellulosic feedstocks will have
both positive and negative environmental
impacts.
Several additional uncertainties related
to the dynamics of the global economy
loom large as the biofuels market unfolds.
Will poor, small farmers in South Asia
benefit from higher world prices? Will
poor net consumers of cassava or maize
in sub-Saharan Africa be affected by price
increases caused by growth in the United
States or Chinese bio-ethanol markets?
Even today, the transmission of agricultural commodity prices from the international to the local scale, particularly in
low-income, food-deficit regions where
the chronically hungry are most affected, is
not clear. Moreover, it is not obvious what

types of substitutions poor consumers are
making or are likely to make in their diets
with price increases in staple foods.
The wide array of potential interactions over space and time in the world
food economy requires policy analyses
that are neither black box models nor
simplistic partial equilibrium solutions.
While these analyses are being pursued,
continued efforts should be promoted to
address food insecurity regionally and
globally through agricultural investments
in low-income countries, particularly
where governance structures are adequate
to permit broadly distributed rural growth.
It is likely that aggregate investments in
agricultural development at the national
or regional level will be more successful
in reducing rural poverty than individual
biofuels investments by specific companies or groups—the latter often resulting
in a silver bullet approach with limited
reach to poor populations.
Growth in biofuels production capacity offers many promises, but also many
threats, for the future course of sustainable
development. The design and implementation of sustainability audits is critical as
the biofuels industry develops, with clear
metrics for evaluating the environmental
and social consequences of biofuels and
feedstock production and for ensuring that
management and governance practices are
compatible with pre-determined sustainability goals. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil provides a good model for
such an audit process and is now being
used to reevaluate a large proposed U.S.
investment in a palm oil–based biodiesel
plant.51 The European Union is also in
the process of creating a set of biofuels
sustainability criteria that will be applied
to domestic production and imports in its
efforts to reach its 10 percent target by
2020.52 It is important that these efforts
remain true to sustainability objectives
and are not used as trade barriers to protect
domestic agricultural markets. Integrating the results of sustainability audits
with analyses of food security impacts of
biofuels expansion would provide useful
input to policymakers, foundations and
private companies investing in biofuels
activities, and international agencies seek-
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ing to reduce global poverty and hunger.
In defense of the world’s poorest populations, it is urgent that the ripple effects of
crop-based biofuels on food security and
the environmental be understood soon
and considered carefully in the design of
development policies and investments.
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